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Introduction 
Paradoxical though it may sound, the foreign 
policy of South Africa, like that of all other 
states, is a story essentially of both continuity 
and change. In political and foreign policy anal-
ysis, change and continuity depend on several 
explanatory factors, including institutional, 
environmental and personality dynamics.1 
Here should be added aspects such as routines 
in decision making, beliefs, socialisation, and 
human and financial resources, which all have 
a bearing on whether a government’s foreign 
policy is the product of continuity or a subject 
of change.2 Let us remember that it is in the na-
ture of governments, especially bureaucracies, 
not to favour change over continuity. South 
African foreign policy theorist Costa Georghiou 
argues that ‘persistence and change coexist 
uneasily, and it is this mixture that makes 
the future so uncertain. The twin forces of 
integration and disintegration, continuity and 
change, creates a mood of both confidence and 
disorientation in international politics’.3
In this article we seek to understand the 
paradox inherent in South Africa’s foreign 
policy by examining its avowed macro-agendas 
within a world increasingly realigning itself 
in powerful economic groupings. It is given as 
read that statements made by policymakers 
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Eradicating poverty, unemployment and in-
equality were not merely ends in their own right 
– they were also means to boosting the econo-
my in a cyclical process that Mbeki championed 
under the rubric of a ‘developmental state’. In 
his modernisation project, emphasis was con-
stantly placed on creating a macro-economic 
environment that could boost growth and cre-
ate opportunities for sharing it. Domestic and 
foreign policy was informed by his understand-
ing that South Africa was characterised by a 
context of ‘Two Nations’ and ‘Two Economies’. 
One was largely poor and black, living mainly 
in conditions of poverty and ranked around 135 
on the Human Development Index. The other 
was largely wealthy and white, and ranked 
around 28th. 
These two economies, belonging to both the 
developed global ‘First World’ and developing 
‘Third World’, led the Mbeki government to 
identify six broad strategic goals that domes-
tic and foreign policy should have in order to 
narrow the gap: eradicating poverty; reducing 
unemployment and creating jobs; fighting 
crime; building the capacity of state; bringing 
about a better Africa; and bringing about a bet-
ter world. The last two aims reveal explicitly a 
line of thinking also evident in a 2005 strategic 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) document 
– that ‘the context of South Africa’s foreign 
policy is firmly rooted in Africa and the South, 
and its national interest is, therefore, defined in 
terms of achieving the challenges of the second 
economy’7. 
As part of a new ‘continentalism’, Mbeki 
sought to influence the inter-African system, 
not in the direction of supra-nationalism or 
explicit federalism, but towards functional-
ism and a rules-based continental order – if 
anything, a kind of confederalism or loose 
cooperation that falls short of binding struc-
tural reform.8 As the Fifteen Year Review put 
it, ‘the regeneration of Africa is the main pillar 
of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. It is 
central to ensuring a better life for all in South 
Africa and on the continent’.9 The fact that in 
2008 South Africa had diplomatic relations 
with 47 of the continent’s states, compared to 
just one at the height of apartheid,  was testi-
mony to its ‘Africa first’ policy.
The Mbeki administration endeavoured 
to remain faithful to the idea of never going 
it alone in Africa, but preferred to build stra-
tegic partnerships as it sought to consolidate 
its agenda. As Mbeki engaged Africans as 
partners, he shunned hegemonic ambitions. 
Therefore, while many commentators over-
stated Pretoria’s leverage and labelled it a ‘he-
gemon’ demanding leadership and dominance, 
Pretoria-Tshwane chose the part of partnership 
and equality with African states. 
Mbeki advocated a New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a modernisa-
tion and pro-growth plan aimed at soliciting 
Western investment, aid, market access and 
assistance for Africa’s development and peace 
operations, in exchange for Africans holding 
themselves accountable politically and eco-
nomically. If Mbeki’s much vaunted ‘African 
Renaissance’ served the purpose of the vision, 
then NEPAD became the policy strategy to 
realise that vision. NEPAD was a modernisa-
tion and reconstruction programme aimed at 
stimulating Africa’s development after decades 
of failures that were the legacies of colonial-
ism, as well as the Cold War, bad governance, 
unsound economic policies and management, 
and destructive conflicts.10 It was a strategy of 
engagement which promoted intra- and extra-
African partnerships.
Major achievements in the African strat-
egy came through multilateralism: the re-
structuring of the South African Development 
Community (SADC) and transformation from 
may assume different forms when delivered to 
different audiences – for instance for the con-
sumption of domestic voters or for the global 
media – yet it is precisely this schizophrenia, 
the legacy of decades of hounding by a vehe-
mently critical world, that has informed the 
new Republic’s political discourse over the last 
12 years or so.   
This policy article tests the commonly held 
view that, in the transition from the Mandela 
to the Mbeki government, continuity was the 
order of the day, while from Mbeki to Zuma it 
purportedly suggested change. We are inter-
ested in establishing whether Mbeki introduced 
important nuances, refinements and changes 
in foreign policy that might reveal some discon-
tinuities, and whether the foreign policy direc-
tions and strategies of the Zuma presidency 
resembled a fundamental break from those 
pursued by Mbeki. In terms of the latter, we 
consider whether the leadership tensions in the 
ANC which brought about the Zuma presidency 
were accompanied by changes in policy, or 
whether this rupture was ironically character-
ised by policy continuities. More interestingly, 
we consider whether stated policy by the Zuma 
government was in line with practice followed 
or whether there were deviations.
1999–2008: Mbeki’s Change 
trumping Continuity
On the face of it, Thabo Mbeki’s vision was 
more internationalist than that of Nelson 
Mandela, perhaps reflecting his exposure to 
international affairs during the ANC’s decades 
in exile, including his years attending univer-
sity in England and political training in Russia. 
Certainly, when he replaced Mandela as presi-
dent in June 1999, the impetus of his diplomacy 
was first to overhaul foreign policy and make it 
more strategic.  He came to advance the course 
of a highly ambitious transformational and de-
velopmental foreign policy programme and, in 
many respects, he modified and refined many 
of the foreign policy directives of the Mandela 
government, of which he was a key member.  
Where Mandela’s government had spoken 
of domestic and continental African interests 
and of ‘universality’, Mbeki would seek, some-
what ambitiously perhaps, to put these words 
into actual policy.  He would come to herald 
the Republic as an ‘active agent of progres-
sive change’4 as he pursued a foreign policy of 
redress and development. He was determined 
to see South Africa become a pivotal state on 
the continent, as a reliable global player follow-
ing a predictable foreign policy in pursuit of a 
progressive agenda. To do this he would come 
to rely heavily on negotiations, diplomacy and 
what became known as ‘soft power’. 
Mandela had struggled to articulate an 
effective national interest paradigm and set-
tled for a foreign policy that sought in part to 
realise the goals of the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP), notably job 
creation, addressing inequalities and accelerat-
ing economic growth. Mbeki however thought 
he could realise his predecessor’s wish to in-
fuse into foreign policy the notion of national 
interest. To do so, he set out to use domestic 
sources for foreign policy and address the di-
chotomy of the country’s domestic and interna-
tionalist roles by anchoring foreign relations, in 
the eyes of voters at least, on domestic goals. A 
strategic 2005 foreign affairs document stated 
that ‘domestic priorities guide the Department’s 
policies and underpin its activities’.5 It further 
stated that ‘South Africa’s interaction with 
the international community must necessar-
ily reflect its national imperatives, including 
such critical issues as job creation and poverty 
alleviation’.6 
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which was established at the Bandung re-
vival, the 50th anniversary commemoration 
in April 2005 co-hosted by South Africa and 
Indonesia14 during the Asia-Africa Sub-regional 
Organisations Conference (AASROC); and the 
African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) bloc within the 
context of EU–ACP relations. As one foreign af-
fairs official said, ‘in relating to Asian states, 
we sought to pursue Africa’s interests’.15
Mbeki had introduced a new, more complex 
and dispersed dimension to North–South dia-
logue, which in essence sought to reformulate 
development as a universal and strategic chal-
lenge facing the international community. This 
reconfigured or modernised notion had as its 
aim a challenge to the international economic 
balance of power, and extraction of significant 
financial resource commitments from the North 
in areas of aid, trade, debt relief and eradica-
tion, and market access.16 
Mbeki and his government approached 
the industrialised powers with much self-
assurance and boldness. Indeed, if the chief 
goal of South–South strategies were to turn 
the South into a more cohesive bloc that could 
engage the North more effectively, then the 
goals of the North–South strategies were just 
as bold: the Mbeki government took it upon 
itself to bargain for more favourable conces-
sions in the areas of political governance, the 
global financial architecture, financing for 
development and a voice for the South in global 
forums. Mbeki’s foreign policy strategists had 
long held the view that ‘engagement with 
developed countries is premised on the notion 
of forging partnerships for peace, security and 
development’.17 Foreign policy came to stress a 
new priority: ‘fundamentally’ altering ‘the re-
lationship between Africa and the North, while 
strengthening the relationship between Africa 
and the South’.18 The goal was to bring about 
international political and economic redress by 
playing a bridging role between these divided 
blocs with the aim of extracting political and 
financial commitments from the North.  
Transformation of global power and eco-
nomic relations featured as major goals of the 
Mbeki government, and as such they built on 
and added to Mandela’s notion of commitment 
to multilateralism and international law. His 
executive collective came to promote ‘global 
governance’ that would influence the balance of 
power in a West-dominated world. On the politi-
cal front, modernised policies campaigned for 
the reform of the global political architecture, 
while on the socio-economic front South Africa 
was concerned with the transformation of the 
global financial systems, as well as with ex-
tracting finances for development commitments 
from multilateral bodies.19 While political policy 
stressed the need to restore the centrality of the 
United Nations (UN) in global affairs and the 
need for a strong disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation global regime, socio-economic pol-
icy pushed for restructuring of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)  and the World Bank. The 
defence of multilateralism strongly emerged as 
a priority. As the Fifteen Year Review stated, ‘a 
commitment to multilateralism is at the heart 
of South Africa’s foreign policy. Since 1994, the 
country has sought to contribute to a transpar-
ent and rules-based international political and 
economic order that advances the interests of 
developing countries’20.    
In a subtle way, Mbeki had taken up 
Mandela’s mantle of domestic change and 
reform, and had skilfully introduced a trans-
formational agenda at home and aligned it 
with a proactive role in foreign diplomacy. The 
West needed South Africa as much as South 
Africa needed the West, and that had profound 
implications for Mbeki’s leverage on the conti-
nent and in multilateral organisations. It gave 
him a strong bargaining hand, and at times 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the 
African Union (AU). Pretoria played a strategic 
role as champion of new values and principles 
in Africa, emphasising the construction of 
sub-regional and continental institutions and 
mechanisms in defence of democratisation and 
a new interventionism against gross violations 
of human rights, genocide, unconstitutional 
changes of government (read coups d’état) and 
instability in one country, threatening broader 
regional instability.11  
Perhaps as wary as Mandela of grand 
continental arrangements, Mbeki saw build-
ing a continental union in Africa – a new 
continentalism but not as a United States of 
Africa – as the most rational way to proceed 
in transforming the African order. Mbeki 
challenged the then Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi’s United States of Africa (USAf) as not 
palatable, and preferred instead an institution-
alised, functionalist approach to continental 
affairs. South Africa’s preference for a looser 
confederation was instrumental in the estab-
lishment of the AU and institutions such as the 
Peace and Security Council, the strengthening 
of the AU Commission, and the establishment 
of an African Court of Human and People’s 
Rights. South Africa was also a key promoter 
of the idea that Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and Sub-regional 
Economic Communities (SECs) could be the 
building blocks of continental development and 
integration.12 
How far this proliferation of partnerships 
would make any difference to domestic trans-
formation remained a key concern, but as 
important were the military conflicts that have 
turned the continent into a volatile region. 
Under Mbeki’s leadership, South Africa made 
a significant shift by adopting a pro-peace-
keeping posture, not just a stance in favour 
of peacemaking. Peacemaking involved the 
thankless negotiations in Burundi, coordinat-
ing the Comores’ peace effort, mediating in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), facilita-
tion in Lesotho and dialogue with Angola, on 
top of dispatching observers in Ethiopia/Eritrea 
and supporting the UN-led process in Western 
Sahara. In peacekeeping it actively helped in 
Burundi, the DRC and Liberia. Mbeki in fact 
continued with the Mandela government’s 
tactic of ‘quiet diplomacy’, this time towards 
Zimbabwe from 1999 onwards.  
While Mandela had committed himself to 
non-alignment, Mbeki subscribed to a more 
elaborate scheme of South–South coopera-
tion as he set out to reinvigorate political and 
economic links between Asia, South America 
and Africa, and emphasised developmental 
goals linked to the expansion of trade, poverty 
reduction through growth, and modernisation 
through infrastructure development and tech-
nical cooperation. To quote the Fifteen Year 
Review, ‘the value of South–South co-operation 
[had to] be visible in increased market access, 
trade and investment benefits for all countries 
of the South and material support for NEPAD 
projects’.13 A key goal of Mbeki’s tri-continental 
strategies was to engage leaders of the three 
continents so that they could organise them-
selves better, speak with one voice and utilise 
multilateral forums in order to extract greater 
political and development commitments from 
the North and/or West. 
Membership of strategic partnerships with 
like-minded states continued to proliferate. 
Pretoria-Tshwane formed ad hoc coalitions, and 
created regional and sub-regional platforms to 
attain its goals. It had played a role in redefin-
ing forums like the Non-aligned Movement 
(NAM), as well as being pivotal in the creation 
of new platforms such as the G20+; the India-
Brazil-South Africa Trilateral Forum (IBSA); the 
New Africa-Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP), 
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the advancement of the global community.29 
Motlanthe reminded South Africans that his 
task was to see out the mandate of the Mbeki 
years; the priorities he identified for his own 
government were the same as those articulated 
by President Mbeki in 2004.   
In his first and only State of the Nation 
Address on 6 February 2009, Motlanthe made 
it known that his was ‘a responsibility, within 
a matter of a few months, to lead the national 
Executive in completing the mandate accorded 
to the ANC in the 2004 elections, and in laying 
the foundation for the post-election adminis-
tration to hit the ground running’. With this, 
Motlanthe signalled continuity, as well as mak-
ing an explicit link between the previous Mbeki 
administration and a future post-2009 election 
government. 
According to the caretaker president, ‘both 
in the G20 meetings and other multilateral 
institutions, our government has argued for 
appropriate and urgent interventions par-
ticularly in the developed countries whence the 
crisis originated and where it is most severe’.30 
Motlanthe made specific reference to Mbeki’s 
role as SADC facilitator in Zimbabwe, and said 
that his government would assist in efforts to 
help reconstruct Zimbabwe and urgently as-
sist in dealing with the humanitarian crisis 
in that country. Over Zimbabwe policy there 
would be continuity. In spite of the continued 
political and refugee crisis in the troublesome 
northern neighbour, Motlanthe did not deviate 
from the Mbeki’s government’s stance in favour 
of engagement in it, stressing the need for a 
negotiated settlement and full implementation 
of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) brokered 
by Mbeki in 2008. On the wider continent, too, 
Motlanthe welcomed the political dialogue be-
tween the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda, and 
stated that his government would continue to 
support the AU in pursuit of the same strategy 
about Mbeki’s contribution to foreign policy in 
particular: ‘[H]e made our country an integral 
part of the continent and worked tirelessly for 
an African rebirth.’25 ‘Through his leadership’, 
continued Zuma, ‘South Africa’s stature grew 
in the continent and globally.’26  
So if continuity, at least in terms of stated 
policy, was to be the order of the day, what 
about the ‘change’ that opponents consistently 
promised? The foundation for the foreign policy 
agenda of the next government was laid by the 
dramatic 52nd ANC Conference in the northern 
city of Polokwane in December 2007, which 
not only witnessed a shift in support from 
Thabo Mbeki to Jacob Zuma, but also adopted 
a number of resolutions, including those on 
international relations and foreign policy.27 
The Motlanthe Months: 
Continuity all the Way
Kgalema Motlanthe, South Africa’s caretaker 
president after the dramatic recalling of Mbeki 
on 20 September 2008, made plain that the 
main goal of his seven-month stint to April 
2009 would be to see out the Mbeki period. As 
such, he gave notice that his intension was not 
to introduce new policies but to ensure that the 
mandate of the Mbeki government was brought 
to a successful conclusion. On 28 September 
2009, Motlanthe gave his first live television 
address to the nation and described the week 
in which Mbeki was recalled as president as 
‘one of the most difficult weeks in the history 
of our young democracy … it has been a week 
of uncertainty and doubt, hurt and anger’.28 
Motlanthe vowed to ‘draw on the example 
set by my immediate predecessor, President 
Thabo Mbeki’ and expressed indebtedness to 
his predecessor for his ‘leadership’ and ‘his 
vision’ in promoting progress in Africa and 
he was forceful in his criticism of the West, as 
was evidenced by his government’s response 
to the September 11 events. However, it was 
still not clear how this increased voice, without 
substantive pooling of sovereignty, could be 
anything more than talk – or such at least was 
the growing concern of many within the ranks 
of the ANC.
2008 and Beyond: Continuity 
with Practical Deviations 
trumping Change  
From 2003 an internecine broedertwis (frater-
nal squabble) pervaded the ANC, which became 
increasingly bitter. This fallout resulted first in 
the deputy president Jacob Zuma being relieved 
of his duties in 2005, followed by a change in 
ANC leadership at Polokwane in December 
2007, plus the forced recalling by the party of 
Thabo Mbeki as head of state in September 
2008, and ultimately Zuma’s election as presi-
dent. This led many an observer to believe that 
there would be radical changes in domestic 
and foreign policy. During Zuma’s election 
campaign hustings, for example, the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), one 
of Zuma’s staunchest defenders, vowed that 
‘everything must change’, a sentiment echoed 
by the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
who vowed that ‘things are going to have to 
change’.21
However, Mbeki’s critics and Zuma’s sup-
porters appeared oblivious to the fact that the 
fight between Zuma and Mbeki within the ANC 
was largely about style and personality, and 
not over policy substance. Zuma’s allies ap-
peared to have misinterpreted the policy mood 
in ANC quarters as they confused anger with 
Mbeki over his style with differences over poli-
cy. The change in leadership in the ANC, sadly 
for them, would not result in a radical change 
in policy, certainly not in foreign policy and 
definitely not in terms of stated policy on pa-
per. Instead of the change that many of Mbeki’s 
detractors had hoped for, we would rather see a 
high degree of the embrace of policies of Mbeki 
as articulated in key foreign policy statements 
and documents associated with the new Zuma 
government. Many of the Mbeki critics who 
yearned for widespread change did not even 
realise that the motto of the Zuma government 
during the election campaign was ‘continuity 
and change’. Elsewhere the author has argued 
that ‘...since Zuma’s emergence as president 
there has, on paper at least, been more conti-
nuity than change in South African foreign 
policy’.22 He went further to argue that ‘such 
changes as have occurred have been changes 
in style and refinements here and there, while 
as regards stated policy, continuity has pre-
vailed’.23 This should not have come as a sur-
prise to seasoned observers of South African 
foreign policy, with the stress here on policy, 
which should not be confused with the analysis 
of second-hand punditry. 
On the eve of Jacob Zuma’s assuming office, 
the president-to-be hinted at continuity when 
all the talk was reconciliatory: ‘[W]e have said 
that … foreign policy will not change. There 
will be continuity’. Indeed, Zuma was signal-
ling anything but radical change, and markers 
were being laid down that promised more of 
the same. In spite of the bitter infighting of 
the previous five years, in his presidential in-
augural address on 9 May 2009 Zuma lauded 
his predecessor’s achievements in foreign 
policy and diplomacy: ‘[H]e took the country 
forward as a true statesman. He made a re-
markable contribution towards strengthening 
our democracy, and laid a firm foundation for 
economic growth and development.’24 As newly 
elected president, Zuma proceeded to opine 
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see the Republic ‘becoming an active agent of 
progressive change’.36 
One of the first moves announced by 
Minister Nkoana-Mashabane was that the 
name of the department responsible for the 
management and coordination of the Republic’s 
diplomacy and foreign policy would change 
from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
to that of DIRCO. According to the new min-
ister, the idea was to emphasise that foreign 
policy would be ‘based upon and is indeed an 
advancement of our domestic priorities at an 
international level’. This did not come as much 
of a surprise, and signalled government’s in-
tention to introduce a new style and approach 
to the conduct of foreign affairs, namely to em-
phasise issues of collaboration and non-hegem-
onic soft-balancing as opposed to dominance, 
hegemonic intentions and power-seeking real-
ist approaches to its relations with other states 
and international entities. Nkoana-Mashabane 
announced that the name had been changed ‘to 
help clarify the mandate of the Department…
The name should reflect the new focus that our 
government wishes to place on partnerships 
and co-operation for development.’37, 38  
However, while talks of fundamental change 
were being dished up for popular consumption, 
in reality many actors hinted at stability and 
predictability. More significantly, they did not 
wish to end those of Mbeki’s policies that were 
proving successful. One such example commu-
nicated by the new Zuma-led government was 
that it would build on the work of the Mbeki 
government in the area of development coop-
eration and proceed to establish a development 
agency for South Africa. The new government 
publicly committed itself to establishing the 
South African Development Partnership Agency 
(SADPA), with the aim of promoting develop-
mental partnerships. According to Nkoana-
Mashabane, the new government intended 
to ‘streamline the work that is currently done 
by different departments on development 
co-operation into a coherent and systematic 
framework’.39 In August 2009, she confirmed 
that ‘work towards the establishment of SADPA 
is currently underway … This agency… will be 
tasked with the management of South Africa’s 
developmental assistance to contribute to 
capacity and institutional building, as well as 
support socio-economic and human resource 
development’.40 
In terms of the Zuma administration’s 
‘Africa prioritisation’ strategies, there emerged 
two broad thematic areas: Africa continental; 
and improving political and economic integra-
tion of the SADC. Even though the government 
set out to pursue its Africa strategies under 
the label of ‘African advancement’, its policy 
borrowed heavily from the Mbeki government’s 
notion of the ‘African agenda’, even retaining 
the very labelling41  Indeed, Deputy Minister of 
International Co-operation, Ebrahim Ebrahim’s 
declaration that the ‘consolidation of the 
African agenda’ would be the main priority in 
South Africa’s foreign policy,42 corroborates 
this view of continuity in Africa strategy. In 
line with the Mbeki posture in Africa, the new 
Zuma government vowed to contribute to the 
promotion of peace, security and stability by 
sustaining involvement in peacekeeping opera-
tions in Africa.43 Policy further stated that the 
Republic would continue with reconstruction 
and development efforts on the continent, es-
pecially in post-conflict situations in countries 
such as the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, Western 
Sahara and Zimbabwe.44 
Whereas the Mbeki government had ex-
panded on the Mandela administration’s idea 
of pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy pos-
ture and expansion of a South–South coopera-
tion strategy, the Zuma government’s policy of 
‘strengthening South–South relations’ marked 
of political dialogue in Burundi, Sudan, Western 
Sahara, Cote d’Ivoire, Somalia, and elsewhere. 
Whereas Mbeki had emphasised a function- 
alist approach to Regional Economic Comm-
unities (RECs) on the continent, Motlanthe 
stressed that his government would ‘use the 
privilege of chairing SADC to strengthen this 
regional institution, with a particular empha-
sis on implementing Summit resolutions and 
cementing regional strategic cohesion’.31 Just 
how this strengthening would take place was 
not spelled out. Instead, the Motlanthe govern-
ment turned its attention to improving SADC’s 
interaction with the Common Market for East 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), another worthy 
cause for trade but hardly underpinned by firm 
commitments to direct integration and peace-
making or peacekeeping.
In terms of South–South cooperation, the 
message in Motlanthe’s State of the Nation ad-
dress was similar to that articulated by Mbeki. 
He insisted that South Africa would continue to 
foster strong ties with China in the belief that 
there was ‘much mutual benefit to be gained 
from our partnership’, and affirmed his gov-
ernment’s ‘commitment to close relations that 
we have forged with Brazil and India through 
IBSA’, the trilateral cooperation initiated by 
Mbeki in 2003. He also preferred a ‘strengthen-
ing of bonds that our country has been forging 
with Russia, and countries in Asia, the Middle 
East, as well as Latin and North America’.32 
Even as pertains global governance strate-
gies, Motlanthe made known that South Africa 
would join other countries from the South and 
‘continue to pursue the cause of the restruc-
turing of the UN, the IMF and other multilat-
eral institutions so they reflect the changed and 
changing global reality and operate in a demo-
cratic, equitable and transparent manner’.. In 
short, the change from Mbeki to Motlanthe 
heralded continuity, not change.  
Enter Zuma: Continuity 
amidst Diffusion
Turning to the new Jacob Zuma-led govern-
ment which was elected into office in April 
2009 and inaugurated in May of that year, it 
articulated policies which read like carbon 
copies of Mbeki’s. In August 2009, the new 
Zuma administration finalised their Medium-
term Strategic Framework (MTSF) to Guide 
Government’s Programme for the Electoral 
Mandate Period 2009–2014, revealing that 
the Zuma administration would cham-
pion its foreign policy under the broad goal of 
‘Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced 
Co-operation’.33
The developmental agenda was in turn 
to be based on the existing ‘key pillars of our 
foreign policy’, under a series of sub-goals or 
sub-categories, namely34 (1) closing the gap 
between domestic and foreign policy; (2) con-
tinued prioritisation of the African continent; 
(3) strengthening of South–South relations; 
(4) relations with strategic formations of the 
North; (5) strengthening political and economic 
relations; and (6) participating in the global 
system of governance. All these were familiar 
themes and suggested continuity, not change. 
While the wording had been adapted here and 
there, in reality it meant more of the same.  
When Deputy Minister of the Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO), Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, told parlia-
ment in June 2009 that South Africa’s approach 
to foreign relations over the next five years 
would ‘be driven by the need to deliver to the 
masses of our people, which is at the core of 
our national interest’, he was not stating 
something novel or original, nor was Deputy 
Minister Ebrahim Ebrahim’s commitment to 
the pursuit of a ‘progressive international-
ism’,35, echoing as it did Mbeki’s commitment to 
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government from 1999 to 2008 essentially fol-
lowed a transformational and developmental 
foreign policy. This was especially true in 
relation to the global governance strategies of 
the Mbeki government. President Zuma has 
attempted to borrow from this dimension of 
Mbeki’s diplomacy too as he and his govern-
ment endorsed the notions of transformation 
and developmentalism in their future foreign 
policy. 
It should also be remembered here that 
the voice and participation of Africa and the 
broader South were key rationales behind 
Mbeki’s transformational global govern-
ance positions. If more evidence is required, 
Nkoane-Mashabane’s declaration soon after 
the April 2009 polls, that ‘we believe that the 
transformation of the international system will 
not only give Africa a bigger voice, but will 
put us in a better position to address the de-
velopmental plight of our continent’,54 marked 
a direct continuation of Mbeki’s position. When 
she also vowed that ‘we will continue to work 
with other nations and progressive non-state 
actors’, as well as ‘for the reform of the UN, 
including the Bretton Woods Institutions’, she 
borrowed directly from the Mbeki script. Just as 
the Minister insisted that ‘we cannot achieve 
our objective of a better world when the current 
configuration of the Security Council of the UN 
is informed by the geo-politics and security 
concerns of the 1950s when most of Africa was 
under colonial rule’,55 she was again identify-
ing directly with the Mbeki position in favour 
of ‘rules-based multilateral approaches to 
problems of international peace and security’,, 
as well as ‘proposals for addressing the short-
comings in the UN system’. 
 Thus, in spite of COSATU’s call on the eve 
of the Zuma government taking office that 
‘everything must change’, in terms of foreign 
policy, very little has changed on paper and 
in terms of articulated foreign policy. In the 
Inroads article of 2011, titled Transformation, 
continuity and diffusion: South African foreign 
policy under Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, the 
author argued that, instead of any farfetched 
change, ‘the Zuma government opted for a 
tactic of merely sticking different labels on 
policy without changing the policy itself ... At 
the same time however’, its journey without a 
map has rendered South Africa’s foreign policy 
‘unpredictable and erratic’.56 The question 
about the Zuma government’s foreign policy in 
relation to continuity and change was not so 
much whether there was change from Mbeki 
to Zuma, because we have established that on 
paper it was sturdiness. In terms of stipulated 
policy there was continuity. Instead the issue 
was an apparent disjuncture between Zuma’s 
stated policy and the actions of the government 
in practice. 
This divergence between stated policy and 
action came about because of a number of rea-
sons and explanatory factors, but because of 
the weaknesses in the institutional apparatus 
in the Zuma government, many deviations 
from the government’s own stated policies crept 
in, and we had what has been called elsewhere 
a ‘diffused’ foreign policy in practice. Stated 
policy on paper did not correspond neatly with 
actual policy in practice. 
Zuma’s first state visit since becoming 
president was to Angola in 2009, a mission 
undertaken to patch up the relationship with 
President Dos Santos and his government, 
which had deteriorated between the two coun-
tries during the Mbeki era. Again, this was not 
so much a change in policy as an attempt to 
ease the frosty relations between Luanda and 
Pretoria-Tshwane, which came about more as 
a result of a personality clash between Dos 
a direct continuation of Mbeki’s South–South 
cooperation and ‘agenda of the South’ strate-
gies.  As with the Mbeki government, the main 
rationale which underscores the South–South 
cooperation strategies of the Zuma government 
would be to ’ensure the creation of political, 
economic and social spheres necessary for 
the fight against poverty, underdevelopment 
and marginalization of the South’. Nkoana-
Mashabane stressed that 
‘South Africa will continue to build relations 
based on solidarity and co-operation with 
regional and sub-regional groups in the South 
such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 
Forum for China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC), 
Africa-India Forum, G77 plus China, the India-
Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, and the 
New Asia-Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) 
in pursuit of the consolidation of the African 
Agenda.’ 45 
Nkoane-Mashabane’s refrain that South Africa 
as a developing country would maintain ‘natu-
ral partnerships with other countries of the 
South with whom we share similar challenges 
and constraints’, was a familiar theme which 
came to the fore during the Mbeki years.46 
Ebrahim’s pledge that South Africa’s South–
South cooperation would focus on its ‘strategic 
alliance’ with India, China and Brazil47 was a 
direct continuation of Mbeki’s strategies to-
wards IBSA and the G-77 Plus China. Zuma was 
present at what might turn out to have been 
the founding meeting of another South–South 
partnership, that between Africa and South 
America.48
Engaging the Northern industrialised pow-
ers and their associations is another pillar of 
the new Zuma administration’s foreign policy 
that echoes Mbeki’s international plans. At 
its core is the pursuit of a ‘developmental 
agenda both on the continent and the develop-
ing world’, as Nkoane-Mashabane explained, 
and to persue a ‘dynamic partnership for devel-
opment and co-operation’.49 Here it should be 
remembered that the Mbeki government’s rela-
tions with developed countries were concerned 
with peace, security and development.50 
The rationale behind Zuma’s stated policy 
in favour of engaging the industrialised pow-
ers was advanced by Nkoane-Mashabane, 
when she stated that ‘countries of the North 
are undeniably an economic power base of the 
world and remain essential to the economic 
well-being of the developing world’.51 Given 
these economic considerations, South Africa 
set out to ’forge partnerships with these coun-
tries within the context of trade, development 
and co-operation.’52 Engaging the North, policy 
stated, would furthermore be ‘done to advance 
South Africa, the continent and the rest of the 
South’s developmental agenda’. In the medium 
term, policy toward the North would see the 
Zuma government continue to pursue a devel-
opmental and investment-oriented approach 
to engagements with the North, such as the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the Group of Eight 
(G8).
The final pillar of the Zuma government’s 
evolving foreign policy is that of ‘participating 
in the global system of governance’, and the 
preference for ‘robust engagement’ in multi-
lateral fora, including championing the reform 
of the UN Security Council. These are themes, 
it will be recalled, that were championed by 
Mbeki’s bifurcated strategy of politico-security 
global governance and socio-economic global 
governance. The very phrase was lifted directly 
from the 2008 DFA Strategic Plan.53 In the early 
part of this treatise, dealing with the foreign 
policy strategies of the Mbeki government, 
the point was made that the South African 
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rights.58 Part of its motivation was fear that the 
UN resolution would be used by NATO and the 
Western powers as a pretext for military inter-
vention against a regime change in Damascus, 
as they did against Libya.
In November, when the Syrian issue was 
moved to the General Assembly for a vote 
condemning Syria’s excesses, 122 countries 
voted in favour, 13 against and 41 abstained, 
including South Africa.59 China and Russia 
vetoed the resolution, while fellow BRICs 
member, Brazil, abstained along with South 
Africa. After the failure to secure a unanimous 
vote in the Security Council, the Syria issue 
became a victim of both South Africa’s burning 
of its fingers regarding Libya and the Western 
powers’ blatant abuse of the issue for ulterior 
regime change and resource war motives. On 
23 November 2011, South Africa decided not 
to support a resolution condemning the hu-
man rights violations and threatening punitive 
measures against the Bashar al-Assad regime; 
the South African mission in New York opted 
to abstain on the vote.60 Scarcely three months 
later we witnessed the continuation of a new 
disturbing trend in foreign policy as govern-
ment again prevaricated. In February 2012 
it voted in favour of a resolution calling on 
President Al-Assad to step down from power.61 
After Russia and China had vetoed the UN 
planned resolution, South Africa emerged with 
yet another position as it came out against 
military intervention in Syria and called on the 
Syrian people to be allowed the opportunity 
and space to determine their own future.62 
In a statement explaining its decision, the 
representatives to South Africa’s mission in 
New York said that the Syria issue needed to 
be discussed in the UN Human Rights Council 
in Geneva, not in the UN Security Council.63 It 
should be remembered that this was a rationale 
often invoked by the Mbeki government, and as 
pertains Syria, the Zuma government’s position 
was much in line with the position of its prede-
cessor’s views. What is less obvious to explain 
is the inconsistencies between South Africa’s 
Libya and Syria positions, and the apparent 
wavering in its decision-making approaches.  
In its response to the crisis surrounding 
the 2010 presidential election in Cote d’Ivoire, 
we witnessed a great deal of prevarication and 
what Kiru Naidoo had called ‘vacillation’ by the 
Zuma government. Zuma first toyed with the 
idea of backing the Angolan position, which 
was in support of former president Laurent 
Gbagbo, after which the South Africans made 
a U-turn by supporting the AU position, which 
called for a negotiated position between the 
belligerents, and later on the AU switched to 
supporting Alassane Ouattara.64 In the end, it 
took a trip to Paris and an official meeting with 
French president Nicholas Sarkozy for Zuma to 
make a decisive call for Gbagbo to leave and for 
Ouattara to be installed as president, but only 
after it backed a negotiated solution between 
Gbagbo and Ouattara.65 The Cote d’Ivoire deci-
sion and how it came about, showed indeci-
siveness on the part of the Zuma government, 
which made it difficult to pin down whether it 
was continuity or change that was at play when 
compared to the Mbeki approach.66 One thing 
is certain – Mbeki was more decisive when it 
came to conflict resolution than Zuma appears 
to be.   
A further example could be highlighted 
here to show that the rhetoric of change often 
invoked by officials in the Zuma government is 
not always backed up by the actions in reality. 
Just as Mbeki offered the Zimbabwe govern-
ment a credit extension of some US$1 billion in 
2005, so in 2011 the Zuma government offered 
the beleaguered Swazi monarchy and govern-
ment a R1,2 billion loan to address the woes of 
their ailing economy.67 What all of this shows 
Santos and Mbeki. Again, practical considera-
tions and differences should not be confused 
with policy differences.  
Certainly, Luanda took umbrage at South 
Africa’s growing influence in Africa under 
Mbeki’s leadership, and there was an element 
of jealousy and envy. South Africa tried on nu-
merous occasions to patch up the relationship, 
but Luanda chose to keep the Mbeki govern-
ment at arm’s length. Zuma, who enjoyed closer 
personal ties with Dos Santos, set out to restore 
the relationship.  
Another example to consider here is the 
furore caused by South Africa’s vote on the UN 
Security Council pertaining to Libya. During 
the debates in the UN Security Council over 
what to do with the recalcitrant and tyranni-
cal President Gaddafi of Libya, in March 2011 
South Africa voted in favour of Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 (which imposed sanctions and a 
no-fly zone over Libya) but abstained on a vote 
in November of that year (which condemned 
the Syrian government’s excesses against its 
own people). However, the Mbeki government 
followed a more consistent line of voting in the 
Security Council on issues such as Myanmar, 
Zimbabwe, Iran and Iraq. The Mbeki govern-
ment’s rationale was that, unless a government 
or state ‘poses a threat to international peace 
and security’, it would refer such an issue to 
another UN body, notably the Human Rights 
Council. Thus the hallmark of the Mbeki gov-
ernment’s behaviour on the Council during 
the period January 2007 to December 2008 
was consistency, and the principled position 
adopted was that those issues which were not 
dubbed ‘threats to international peace and 
security’, and which could be resolved through 
peaceful and negotiated means did not belong 
in the Security Council. 
The Zuma government’s behaviour on the 
Council during the period January 2011 until 
approximately December of that year revealed 
not just inconsistency but confusion. What is 
even more interesting about the Zuma govern-
ment’s voting behaviour in terms of the Libyan 
debacle is that it appeared to have taken many 
of its original positions in apparent isolation of 
the AU, which nominated South Africa to serve 
for a second term as a non-permanent mem-
ber on the Council. The AU’s position rejected 
‘...any foreign military intervention, whatever 
its form’.57 Much confusion emerged because 
South Africa voted in favour of resolutions 
1970 and 1973, together with two other African 
members, Gabon and Nigeria, and soon after, 
when it became apparent that North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) was using the 
resolutions for ‘regime change’ purposes and 
to bring about a resource war in that country, 
South Africa criticised the very resolutions 
it had voted for. Again, South Africa’s vote 
showed confusion and diffusion. South Africa 
took these votes in apparent isolation of the 
AU, the continental body which nominated it to 
serve on the Council for another two years from 
January 2011 to December 2012, after its origi-
nal stint of January 2007 until December 2008. 
While many commentators have tried to 
rationalise South Africa’s Libya vote in favour 
of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 as having been 
motivated by ethical and moralistic consid-
erations a la the Nelson Mandela attempts at 
a moralistic and values-driven foreign policy 
orientation between 1994 and 1999, no sooner 
had South Africa adopted this apparent moral-
istic position – and stung by widespread criti-
cism against its handling of the Libya issue, 
including its prevarication and backtracking 
after NATO’s abuse of the UN mandate given 
to it to execute resolutions 1970 and 1973 –in 
October 2011 South Africa decided to abstain 
on a crucial vote in the UN Security Council 
condemning Syria’s violations of human 
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is that the public speak and idiom often em-
ployed of ‘change’ and ‘difference’ is not always 
backed by action in reality. 
Finally, when President Zuma delivered his 
2012 State of the Nation Address on 9 February, 
there was not a single reference to matters of 
foreign policy or diplomacy, except for one line 
referring to NEPAD in the context of infrastruc-
tural development. This again conveys a mes-
sage about foreign policy as an afterthought, 
and may help to explain the haphazard nature 
of foreign policy.  
Conclusion: The Change 
of Continuity
The last 12 years of South Africa’s foreign 
policy have been a story of promised change 
but general continuity, with the latter at 
times trumping the former when it was least 
expected, and change prevailing when the 
assumption was that continuity would be the 
order of the day.  
There was a widespread view that the tran-
sition from the Mandela to the Mbeki era was 
marked by continuity rather than change. The 
reality is that Mbeki introduced many refine-
ments and changes to foreign policy, and in a 
sense it was radically overhauled. Africa was 
elevated to high priority in Mbeki’s foreign 
policy trajectory, and he was determined to 
leave an imprint of the country as a reliable 
partner, working with fellow African states, 
not as a hegemon bent on dictating the terms 
to the rest of the continent. He also pursued 
a highly ambitious South–South agenda, far 
more so than the one championed by Mandela, 
and links with Latin America, Asia and the 
Caribbean became important new avenues in 
the Republic’s international relations. 
Mbeki also articulated a clear North–South 
agenda in which he sought to extract commit-
ments from the industrialised powers in the 
forms of aid, debt relief, market access, trade 
and resources for peace support operations that 
would help to bolster Africa and the South’s 
development goals. He pursued equally grand 
aims pertaining to global governance, ar-
ticulating political governance goals alongside 
socio-economic global governance aims. The 
former were aimed at transforming political 
institutions such as the UN Security Council, 
whereas the latter focused on the need to trans-
form global socio-economic institutions such as 
the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and to ensure that Africa 
and the South enjoyed greater levels of voice 
and participation.  The changes introduced in 
South African foreign policy and diplomacy 
during the Mbeki period should therefore not be 
underestimated, but they did not achieve what 
they were intended to, namely a narrowing of 
the gap between the two domestic economies. 
In the run-up to the April 2009 elections, 
many in the ANC threatened a decisive shift 
away from the policy agenda of the Mbeki era 
and towards sweeping change. However, as far 
as foreign policy is concerned, these threats 
did not materialise. Even before he became 
head of state, Zuma signalled that policy would 
not change and that there would be continu-
ity. Indeed, stated policy as it was articulated 
on paper revealed this continuity; practice, 
however, revealed deviations from it. President 
Kgalema Motlanthe had already vowed to 
continue with the Mbeki foreign policy agenda 
and his brief seven-month stint did not see the 
introduction of any major changes in contradic-
tion to Mbeki’s agenda.  
Zuma inherited from Mbeki a well-institu-
tionalised foreign policy that borrowed heavily 
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from the foreign policy rubrics of his predeces-
sor under the mantra of ‘pursuing African 
advancement in enhanced international 
cooperation’. Zuma made it just as clear that, 
in line with the Mbeki approach, his govern-
ment would continue to pursue a ‘broad-based 
developmental’ foreign policy trajectory. Just 
as the Mbeki administration had emphasised 
an African agenda, South–South cooperation, 
North–South dialogue and global governance, 
so the Zuma-led administration is articulating 
a similar set of foreign policy pillars. These 
are African advancement, strengthening 
South–South relations, engaging the North 
and actively participating in the global system 
of governance. Even the Zuma government’s 
emphasis on a domestically driven foreign 
policy was akin to a notion pursued by both the 
Mandela and Mbeki governments, if not as well 
articulated or skilfully constructed. 
To conclude, while following the immediate 
aftermath of the dramatic recalling of Thabo 
Mbeki as head of state in September 2008, 
much of the talk inside and outside government 
and even inside the ruling ANC, has been of 
radical change under Zuma. The reality, howev-
er, has been that the articulated foreign policy 
of the government, at least as stated on paper, 
has in the main suggested continuity. The 
stated foreign policy borrowed heavily from the 
Mbeki script. However, because of largely insti-
tutional weaknesses which characterised the 
state and foreign policy apparatus of the Zuma 
government, fuelled in the main by the spill-
over of broedertwiste (fraternal squabbles) and 
factionalisation in the ANC, fragmentation has 
been the order of the day, and a great deal of 
diffusion and confusion came to mark foreign 
policy, and deviations from even government’s 
own stated foreign policy. 
In short, during the transition from Mbeki 
to Zuma, there was continuity in policy on 
paper but detours in practice. The moral of 
the story is that the fractured nature of the 
transition and government that Zuma came 
to preside over has negative implications, not 
just for foreign policy, but for all dimensions of 
national policy as well. 
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